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TAGS: [PARM](#) [KACT](#) [MARR](#) [PREL](#) [RS](#) [US](#)
SUBJECT: SFO-GVA-VIII: (U) REQUEST FOR GUIDANCE - 3, ELIMINATION
MONITORING, FEBRUARY 15, 2010

REF: 10 CD GENEVA 49 (SFO-GVA-VIII-004)
10 CD GENEVA 75 (SFO-GVA-VIII-015); 10 CD GENEVA 73 (SFO-GVA-VIII-025)

CLASSIFIED BY: Rose A. Gottemoeller, Assistant Secretary, Department
of State, VCI; REASON: 1.4(B), (D)

[1](#)1. (U) This is SFO-GVA-VIII-051.

SUMMARY AND GUIDANCE REQUESTED

[1](#)2. (S) Summary: The U.S. and Russian sides came away from the Mullen-Makarov meeting in Moscow with sharply differing impressions of the deal reached on the conduct of inspections to confirm the elimination of solid-fueled ICBMs, solid-fueled SLBMs, and mobile launchers for ICBMs. The United States believed that as part of a deal involving U.S. acceptance of the annual quotas of ten Type-1 and eight Type-2 inspections, and the fact that confirmation of elimination would fall under Type-2 inspections, the Russians agreed that the United States would have the right to directly inspect all items eliminated each treaty year by having accumulated the entire output of the elimination process over the course of the year into large batches at 6-month intervals. In contrast, the Russian delegation in Geneva asserts that the sides agreed to create two batches of such eliminated items each year that would be subject to Type-2 inspections at the conversion or elimination (Core) facilities for solid-fueled strategic missiles and mobile ICBM launchers respectively, but that these batches would include only a total of approximately 50 percent of the annual output of

eliminated items.

13. (S) In our talks in Geneva, the Russians steadfastly refuse to agree to provide us with the opportunity to inspect semi-annual or quarterly batches of the eliminated items that encompass the full year's output of eliminations. Given this development, we have tentatively explored with the Russians a compromise approach that would build upon the Russian proposal to have them accumulate two batches per year, each of which contains approximately 25 percent of the annual elimination output, by adding the right to conduct Type-2 elimination inspections between announced batches when portions of the remaining items eliminated each year are on display in the open for national technical means (NTM) observation and subject to inspection. The Russians have clearly indicated a willingness to agree to such an approach. Some on the U.S. delegation request guidance to drop the U.S. demand that all of the eliminated items be available for Type-2 inspections in batches and seek to agree instead on this hybrid approach, called Option 1 that combines periodic batching with the right to conduct inspections on the unbatched output of eliminated items as well.

14. (S) Others on the U.S. delegation would prefer to stay with current guidance for the time being. However, if Washington decides to pursue a new approach, these members recommend dropping the batching concept altogether and would rely instead upon the right to conduct up to two Type-2 inspections each year to confirm

the data of the items located at both the solid-fueled missile and mobile ICBM launcher CorE facilities, to include those items undergoing elimination. In both options, the sides have agreed that the eliminated items would be displayed in the open for an agreed period to facilitate NTM observation of the eliminated items.

15. (S) The delegation requests Washington either reconfirm current guidance, or examine Options 1 and 2 and provide new guidance based on one of the approaches. Background and analysis are in paragraphs 6-15. The guidance request is in paragraph 16-17. End summary.

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS

16. (S) Background: Throughout the START Follow-on (SFO) negotiations, the U.S. and Russian sides have disagreed on the modalities of inspection activity to be used to confirm the results of the CorE of strategic offensive arms and other declared data at CorE facilities. During the Mullen-Makarov meeting in Moscow in January, the sides agreed that conversion or elimination inspections would be conducted as Type-2 inspections within an annual quota of eight such inspections, and appeared to agree on the availability for inspection of 100 percent of the annual output of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs and mobile ICBM launchers. Unfortunately, no session was held at the end of the day of negotiations to sum up and record the results of the bargaining on the conduct of elimination inspections.

17. (S) The U.S. side left Moscow with the belief that the Russians had agreed to accumulate or "batch" half of their annual output of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs twice each year at the

Votkinsk CorE facility, for a total availability of 100 percent of the output of the elimination process. In the view of the U.S. side, the Russians would openly display the batch of eliminated first stage motor casings for 60 days for observation by NTM and provide a 30-day window within which the United States would have the right to conduct a Type-2 inspection with a team of up to five inspectors. A similar process was to be applied to the inspection of eliminated mobile ICBM launchers at the Piban'shur CorE facility. The U.S. delegation came to Geneva under instructions to incorporate this agreed approach into the Inspection Activities portion of the Protocol.

18. (S) The Russian delegation claims to have come away from the Mullen-Makarov talks with a very different understanding of what was agreed. They too assert that the sides agreed on periodic accumulation or batching of the eliminated solid-fueled ICBM and SLBM first stages at Votkinsk, but, in their view, this would apply to only a total of 50 percent, as opposed to 100 percent, of the

annual output of eliminated missiles and mobile ICBM launchers. Consequently, they have developed draft language for the Inspection Activities Protocol that reflects the more limited approach to the Type-2 inspections used for confirmation of eliminations of solid-fueled missiles and mobile ICBM launchers.

19. (S) During our current round in Geneva, the starkly differing perceptions of the two sides very quickly became apparent. Following our guidance, the U.S. side initially argued for implementation of the semi-annual batching of 50 percent of the eliminated items and having the right to conduct a Type-2 inspection of the facility for each batch, or 100 percent of the annual output, by using up to two inspections at each CorE facility. The Russians, in contrast, said they were prepared to pull together two batches each year, for both the eliminated solid-fueled missiles and eliminated mobile ICBM launchers, but each batch would contain only 25 percent of the annual output of eliminated items. The United States would have the right to expend a Type-2 inspection for each of these batches. The remaining 50 percent of the Russian missiles and mobile ICBM launchers eliminated annually would be displayed in the open for NTM observation at the CorE facilities as they emerged incrementally from the elimination process, but would not be subject to on-site inspection. Thus, the United States would have the right to inspect up to 50 percent of the items eliminated each year, but Russia, not the United States, would select which 50 percent of the missiles and mobile ICBM launchers were available for on-site confirmation of elimination.

110. (S) The U.S. Inspection Protocol Working Group, in the course of discussions with its Russian counterparts, has explored some informal ideas to resolve this issue. These discussions are described below. At this point, these explorations have produced a significant amount of agreement between the sides on an approach labeled Option 1. In addition, an alternative view has been developed more recently within the U.S. delegation. It is described below as Option 2.

111. (S) The initial U.S. delegation response to the Russian post-Moscow position was to discuss the possibility that the Russians would accumulate their annual solid-fueled missile and mobile launcher eliminations into four roughly equal batches, noting that this method was more in keeping with Russian historical practice and still consistent with the agreement reached in Moscow. Under this approach, the United States would have the right to inspect each of the four batches, but with the already agreed limit of no more than two Type-2 inspections at the same facility in a given year, would be limited to inspecting no more than two of these 25 percent batches or 50 percent of the annual eliminations. The Russian delegation refused to consider this approach.

¶12. (S) In our internal discussions and exchanges with the Russian delegation over the past week, we have mutually explored an alternative approach, Option 1, that builds off of and expands the Russian proposal. It falls well short of guaranteeing the right to directly inspect 100 percent of the annual output of eliminated

items. Under this alternative, each year the Russians would create two batches of eliminated items for possible Type-2 inspection by the United States at the solid-fueled missile and mobile ICBM launcher CorE facilities, with each batch containing approximately 25 percent of the year's output of eliminated items. If the United States elects not to inspect either (or both) of these 25 percent batches, the eliminated items would still be displayed in the open for 60 days for NTM viewing (the Russians propose this display period should be only 30 days) and then be shredded.

¶13. (S) In addition, if the United States chose not to conduct one of the announced "batch" inspections under this alternative the U.S. would have the right to conduct full Type-2 elimination inspections during the periods of the treaty year when portions of the remaining 50 percent of the solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs as well as mobile ICBM launchers were incrementally being eliminated, notified as available for inspection, and displayed in the open in small groups. During this period of incremental elimination, a certain amount of "unplanned" batching would likely occur. That is, there would likely be overlaps among small groups of 2-4 eliminated items during the course of the 30-day periods when each increment is subject to inspection. Given the U.S. offer to limit the inspection team to five members, this approach would restrict the flexibility for the United States to conduct sequential inspections. A Type-2 elimination inspection at the CorE facility would have to be the second of the two sequential inspections and an agreement would have to be reached to accommodate the additional five members of a normal Type-2 inspection that could not be part of the Type-2 elimination inspection.

¶14. (S) The most critical point under this option is that the United States would have the right and the opportunity to exercise that right at a time of its choosing to inspect all of the annual output of eliminated items. If the United States were to withhold one of its two annual inspections at the relevant CorE facility until the very end of the treaty year, the Russian side would be vulnerable to a U.S. Type-2 elimination inspection of the entire output of eliminated items during the course of the year, or until the U.S. side had expended the two inspections at each of the CorE facilities. As a practical matter, the United States could, at most, actually inspect no more than 50 percent of the annual eliminated output were it to choose to inspect the two planned batches. If the United States were to choose to combine the inspection of one announced batch with one "unbatched" inspection, we would likely see no more than 35-40 percent of the annual elimination total. In the case of both the two 25 percent batches as well as the incremental elimination of the remainder of the yearly output of eliminated missiles and mobile ICBM launchers, all of these items would be displayed in the open for an agreed period for viewing by NTM or until they were inspected. That, combined with the total vulnerability of the Russian side to inspection throughout the year, will create a powerful deterrent to cheating in the elimination process.

¶15. (S) Other delegation members propose to develop and negotiate a different approach to inspecting eliminations, Option 2, which drops the batching concept. This option would call for the conduct of Type-2 inspections, with full Type-2 inspection rights to

inspect the entire CorE facilities, at both the Votkinsk and Piban'shur up to two times each year, at times chosen by the

inspecting Party. This approach is predicated on Russia providing site diagrams for the Votkinsk and Pibon'shur facilities that were the same as those provided under the START Treaty and on their willingness to make available all items subject to inspection within the inspectable area during such an inspection. This proposal would allow the United States to confirm the accuracy of all the data declared for the facilities and to confirm the elimination of all items being displayed in the open in accordance with a 60-day display window using a team of up to 10 inspectors. The benefit of this approach would be to permit the United States randomly to sample all missiles and launchers undergoing elimination. It would also retain the flexibility for the United States to conduct sequential inspections as needed. Consequently, two such inspections at one of the two Core facilities in a given year would likely inspect at most 20-30 percent of the year's output of eliminated items. It should be noted that this option also provides total vulnerability of the Russian side to inspection throughout the year, thus creating a powerful deterrent to cheating in the elimination process.

GUIDANCE REQUESTED

¶16. (S) The record of the delegation's exchanges with the Russian side during round VIII to date, on the percentage of items to be inspected during a Type-2 inspection of eliminated solid-fueled ICBMs and their launchers (Reftels), clearly indicates differing U.S. and Russian views of the outcome on this issue during the January 22 Mullen-Makarov meeting in Moscow. In this context, delegation requests that Washington either reconfirm existing guidance, or authorize deployment of an alternative approach. (Begin comment: HOD notes that the majority of agencies represented on the delegation support deploying an alternative approach at this time. One agency supports a reconfirmation of existing guidance for the time being. End comment.)

¶17. (S) If the decision is made to proceed with an alternative approach at this time, then delegation requests that Washington examine Option 1 and Option 2 and provide guidance based on one of the two. It should be noted that informal discussions with the Russian side have indicated that Option 1 would be readily negotiable. The negotiability of Option 2 is unknown, but it falls within the concept of a normal Type-2 inspection. If that approach is chosen, the biggest issues to resolve are likely to be the location of the inspections for the eliminated solid-fueled missiles (the two burn-out facilities at Krasnoarmeisk and Perm vs. the Core facility at Votkinsk) and the size of the inspection teams, as noted above.

¶18. (U) Gottemoeller sends.
LARSON